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The world has evolved. Modern society is largely dependent on technology, 
and there is a never-ending appetite for scientific development; there is often 
new technology released that is making lives more convenient, and more 
connected, than ever. Many Americans live in a world where every click and 
internet search leaves a digital trail which can be stored and stitched together to 
reveal an individual’s innermost private life.1 Current law provides minimal 
privacy protection to individuals, undermining Americans’ Fourth Amendment 
safeguard that many hold essential to certain individual freedoms.2 The Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause.”3 
The terms “unreasonable” and “reasonable” have become basic principles that 
have been used to guide authority.4 However, in today’s increasingly digitally 
connected world, where one has little choice but to use the internet to function, 
                                                          
 1 Daniel Zwerdling, Your Digital Trail, and How It Can Be Used Against You, NPR 
(Sept. 20, 2013), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/09/30/226835934/ 
your-digital-trail-and-how-it-can-be-used-against-you. 
 2 Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment “Papers” and the Third-
Party Doctrine, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 29, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/ 
our-work/research-reports/rethinking-privacy-fourth-amendment-papers-and-third-party-
doctrine. 
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 4 Jonathan Kim, Fourth Amendment, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment (last updated June 2017). 
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there is a concern as to what exactly is “reasonable.” This is because many smart 
devices share users’ information with third parties.5 In fact, in a world where 
digital technology has revolutionized the way in which Americans conduct daily 
business, many feel as if an expectation of privacy no longer exists.6 
This sharing of information has led to a growing privacy gap that denies 
Fourth Amendment protection, more specifically the “third-party doctrine.” In a 
briefing to members of Congress, the Congressional Research Service described 
the third-party doctrine as follows: 
In these cases, the Court held that people are not entitled to an 
expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily provide to 
third parties. This legal proposition, known as the third-party 
doctrine, permits the government access to, as a matter of Fourth 
Amendment law, a vast amount of information about individuals, 
such as the websites they visit; who they have emailed; the phone 
numbers they dial; and their utility, banking, and education records, 
just to name a few.7 
In the increasingly digital world, companies hold a plethora of information on 
behalf of their customers, which these customers have voluntarily provided.8 
Information that is voluntarily provided is not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment; the Supreme Court has held that the information “a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject 
of Fourth Amendment protection.”9 The doctrine has allowed the government to 
access information using a standard lower than probable cause.10 This doctrine 
should be reassessed to better fit into the digital age. Property law, a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and the trespass doctrine, to name a few standards of 
deciding what is private, are not promising steppingstones on which to continue 
to base Fourth Amendment claims. 
Technological advancements and the proliferation of third-party records since 
                                                          
 5 Lisa A. Schmidt, Social Networking and the Fourth Amendment: Location Tracking 
on Facebook, Twitter and Foursquare, 22 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 515, 524 (2012). 
 6 See Scenario ONE: The New Normal, U.C. BERKELEY CTR. FOR LONG-TERM 
CYBERSECURITY, https://cltc.berkeley.edu/scenario/scenario-one/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2020) 
(suggesting that by 2020, most of people’s information will be kept online, leaving people 
vulnerable to data breaches, government intervention, and public display of sensitive 
information). 
 7 RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43586, THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT & THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE (2014). 
 8 Timothy Morey et al., Customer Data: Designing for Transparency and Trust, HARV. 
BUS. REV., May 2015, at 1, 4. 
 9 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 10 Margaret E. Twomey, Voluntary Disclosure of Information as a Proposed Standard 
for the Fourth Amendment’s Third-Party Doctrine, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
401, 410 (2015). 
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the doctrine’s inception in two Supreme Court decisions in the late 1970s11 raise 
questions about the stability of this doctrine in modern society. 
The way the Supreme Court has historically looked at the Fourth Amendment 
is analogous to a patchwork quilt; the Supreme Court attempts to fix privacy 
concerns by evaluating technological advances one-by-one rather than 
considering what will come next or how one decision could impact future 
technologies. Katz,12 United States v. Jones,13 and Riley v. California14 are 
Supreme Court cases that exhibit this piecemeal approach. 
As technology transforms the way people participate in society, the core 
Fourth Amendment protection to feel secure in one’s person, home, papers, and 
effects is beginning to erode. Under the third-party doctrine, the government can 
obtain any information that a person has disclosed to a third party, as the doctrine 
states that police do not need a warrant to search and seize consumers’ private 
data on the internet.15 Instead, the government or its agents can issue a subpoena 
to a third party, which is a non-governmental institution, in order to capture 
desired information.16 As a result, the third-party doctrine allows the government 
to circumvent Americans’ Constitutional guarantees without a warrant.17 Under 
the third-party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment does not guarantee the privacy 
of personal data held by private companies, should the government request this 
information.18 
In this way, the third-party doctrine acts as a general warrant as it is a blanket 
request that provides the government access to vast amounts of information 
retained by third-party service providers. General warrants were antithetical to 
the Founders’ wishes at the founding of the country, and these wishes should be 
carried through in the interpretation of privacy rights today.19 
Carpenter v. United States is the most recent Supreme Court case that takes 
issue with the third-party doctrine, specifically focusing on the relatively new 
                                                          
 11 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 
(1979). 
 12 Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
 13 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 14 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 15 Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 811 (2005). 
 16 Id. at 805. 
 17 Cristina Del Rosso, Protecting Online Privacy in the Digital Age: Carpenter v. United 
States and the Fourth Amendment’s Third-Party Doctrine 3 (2019) (B.A. thesis, University 
of Central Florida) (on file with the University of Central Florida libraries). 
 18 Slobogin, supra note 15, at 811. 
 19 See generally Lee Arbetman & Michelle Perry, Search and Seizure: The Meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment Today, SOCIALSTUDIES, http://www.socialstudies.org/sites/default/ 
files/publications/se/6105/610507.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2020) (discussing the history of 
the Fourth Amendment and how it applies to society today). 
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issue of how to treat cell-site location information (“CSLI”).20 In writing for the 
majority, Chief Justice Roberts opined that Carpenter was a narrow ruling that 
left existing precedent undisturbed and would not require law enforcement, in 
most cases, to obtain a warrant when seeking information held by third-party 
companies.21 However, because the ruling was limited in only applying to CSLI, 
the parameters of this new-found protection remain unclear. 
Society must reevaluate the third-party doctrine and the way it impacts lives 
both now and in the future, especially as it relates to emerging technology. This 
article proceeds in four sections. The first section reviews the Supreme Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence focused on the third-party doctrine and 
twenty-first century technology in order to examine how the current path for 
privacy rights is destined to fail. The second section examines how the current 
understanding of the doctrine applies to certain digital information like the 
information in Carpenter. The third section considers specific types of 
technology that store consumers’ data and how the privacy they voluntarily 
share can be used against them in this digital age, particularly, how digital 
technologies threaten to exclude immeasurable quantities of personal 
information from Fourth Amendment protection. The final section offers a 
review of current theories of privacy and suggestions on how to proceed. 
I. THE LANGUAGE AND HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
To discuss the inconsistencies of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment, a review of its origins and history is imperative. The first 
clause of the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, 
while the second clause specifically bans the use of “general warrants.”22 
The Warrant Clause, which is understood to be the second clause of the text, 
is thought to regulate warrant authority.23 This clause is believed to ban the use 
of “general warrants,” which are blanket warrants that can be obtained without 
an “adequate showing of cause.”24 They “allowed officers to search wherever 
they wanted and to seize whatever they wanted, with few exceptions.”25 
The Founding Fathers “sought to prevent unjustified searches” from 
occurring in the first place;26 regardless of location, the Founders desired 
                                                          
 20 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). 
 21 Id. at 2220. 
 22 Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
547, 551 (1999). 
 23 Id. at 558. 
 24 Id. 
 25 LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 153 (1999). 
 26 Id. at 576. 
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protections for personal items.27 Moreover, unlike the real property discussed in 
the text of the Amendment, effects could be carted away by the government.28 
The Founders did not seek a post-intrusion remedy; instead they implemented a 
deterrent to the government issuance of a nonspecific warrant.29 Should an 
officer seize an item without a valid warrant, the citizen whose person, house, 
papers, or effects had been the subject of a trespass could hold the officer liable 
in tort.30 
The Founders’ goal in eliminating general warrants was to ensure that the 
oppressive practices of the crown in Great Britain could not be used in their new 
nation.31 Famous English cases involving the search and seizure of papers to 
silence critics of the king struck a nerve with many of the colonies.32 The first 
of these cases surrounds Mr. John Wilkes, who was accused of writing articles 
mocking the king and his ministers.33 Wilkes was subjected to an invasive search 
under a general warrant and subsequently arrested.34 Wilkes sought to enforce 
his right to security in his house and brought trespass actions against the officers 
who searched his property; the jury ultimately ruled in favor of Wilkes.35 
The second case, which arose out of similar circumstances to Wilkes, was 
Entick v. Carrington,36 a cornerstone case that “foreshadowed the requirements 
of the fourth amendment’s search and seizure clause by holding that seizures of 
certain papers are impermissibly intrusive.”37 In Entick, the Secretary of State 
authorized a warrant to search for some documents on Entick’s land.38 In 
executing the warrant, many of Entick’s books, papers, and pamphlets were 
seized.39 Entick sued for trespass, leading the court to condemn the search and 
                                                          
 27 Maureen E. Brady, The Lost “Effects” of the Fourth Amendment: Giving Personal 
Property Due Protection, 125 YALE L.J. 946, 985 (2016) (“[D]ictionaries from the period 
indicate that ‘effects’ was synonymous with personal property. . . .”). 
 28 Id. at 991. 
 29 LEVY, supra note 25, at 577. 
 30 Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 60 (1996). 
 31 Id. at 74. 
 32 Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REV. 869, 
887, 928 (1985). 
 33 Id. at 887, 887 n.102; Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489. 
 34 Schnapper, supra note 32, at 886–87 (explaining that the warrant failed to name 
Wilkes, and it did not specify items to be seized or particular places to be searched). 
 35 Id. at 887–88. 
 36 Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029. For a complete 
account on the Entick decision, look to the Howell’s State Trials. They present “the 
Judgment itself at length, as delivered by the Lord Chief Justice of the Common-Pleas from 
written notes.”; Schnapper, supra note 32, at 880. 
 37 Schnapper, supra note 32, at 876–77. 
 38 Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1030–32; Schnapper, supra note 32, at 880. 
 39 Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1030–32; Schnapper, supra note 32, at 880. 
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seizure; the court then held that the government could not seize private papers 
even with a valid warrant.40 For the court, the issue was much deeper than the 
physical trespass; rather, it was concerned with protecting “the indefeasible 
rights of personal security, liberty, and private property.”41 
Wilkes and Entick served as an impetus to the Founding Fathers to ensure the 
types of governmental overreach that had occurred at the hands of the British 
were not adopted in their new nation. Instead, the Framers believed judicial 
officers were more adept at determining whether a search was reasonable,42 
favoring judicial approval for specific warrants to determine whether there were 
adequate grounds for intrusion.43 
Although the Constitution does not expressly grant a right to privacy,44 Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence encompasses an expectation of privacy.  In 1890, 
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis wrote about the legal right to privacy, 
declaring the right to privacy as an individual’s “right of determining ordinarily, 
to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to 
others.”45 Furthermore, they articulated privacy as the “right to be let alone.”46 
II. THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE AS A GENERAL WARRANT 
The Framers loathed general warrants primarily because they did not want 
one individual with arbitrary discretion to decide when someone or something 
would be searched, especially with respect to “persons, houses, papers, and 
effects.”47 
Wilkes and Entick exemplify a time when the English government used 
general warrants to invade the privacy of its people at its own will.48 This 
behavior is similar to the third-party doctrine, because the doctrine allows for 
the exercise of broad discretion when dealing with an individual and his or her 
effects.49 Currently, the third-party doctrine enables the police and government 
                                                          
 40 Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1030–32; Schnapper, supra note 32, at 881. 
 41 Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1198 
(2016). 
 42 Davies, supra note 22, at 577. 
 43 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADE OFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY 4 (2011). 
 44 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment 
cannot be translated into a general constitutional ‘right to privacy.’ “). 
 45 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
198 (1890). 
 46 Id. at 193. 
 47 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 48 See WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL 
MEANING 56–58, 96–100, 439–40, 490–91 (2009). 
 49 John Villasenor, What You Need to Know About the Third-Party Doctrine, THE 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 30, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/12/what-
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to engage in surveillance and monitoring of one’s daily life, similar to the 
general warrant that the Fourth Amendment ultimately intended to prevent.50 
The Founding Fathers would have despised this doctrine. 
In today’s digitally connected world, the police only need to issue a subpoena 
to a third party to request desired data; there is no warrant requirement.51 
Without a specific warrant, the government is conducting the very type of 
general searches the Fourth Amendment was created to prevent.52 This 
amendment guarantees citizens freedom from arbitrary government intrusion.53 
It rests on the right to be free from government surveillance unless there is 
probable cause.54 
The third-party doctrine ignores the warrant requirement in the Fourth 
Amendment and allows the police to circumvent a warrant request from a judge, 
undermining free society and creating a culture of routine surveillance. 
III. THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE CASE REVIEW 
The progression of case law can help determine whether the third-party 
doctrine should still govern access to information as technology becomes 
increasingly complex and common. The following Supreme Court cases detail 
the development of the third-party doctrine. 
Katz is the starting point for many Fourth Amendment cases because this is 
where the Supreme Court established the reasonable expectation of privacy test, 
which was articulated in Justice Harlan’s concurrence.55 Harlan’s two-part 
framework first asks whether an individual retained an “actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy,” and second, whether that expectation is one that 
“society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ “56 The party must satisfy both 
prongs of this test to claim there has been an intrusion that is recognized under 
the Fourth Amendment.57 The court has since endorsed this framework and 
considers it to be controlling in Fourth Amendment analysis.58 
                                                          
you-need-to-know-about-the-third-party-doctrine/282721/. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See Slobogin, supra note 15, at 826. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 54 Id. at 356–57. 
 55 See id. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 56 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Mike Godwin, What’s Next for the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy? The Supreme 
Court’s Ruling in Carpenter Raises New Questions., SLATE (June 27, 2018), 
https://slate.com/technology/2018/06/after-the-supreme-courts-carpenter-ruling-where-is-
the-reasonable-expectation-of-privacy-heading.html. 
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In Katz, the court held that electronically listening to and recording the 
defendant’s words by wiretapping a public phone booth, the door of which was 
closed, violated the defendant’s privacy.59 Because the defendant in Katz took a 
reasonable step to protect his privacy by shutting the door to the booth,60 he was 
likely more concerned about an “uninvited ear” than an “intruding eye.”61 
Prior to Katz, the court had held that searches typically had to occur in 
someone’s home; however, after Katz, a physical intrusion was no longer 
necessary to constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.62 In establishing 
these new provisions, the court reasoned that “the Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places. . . . [W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”63 
Miller and Smith are two of the most significant Fourth Amendment cases 
decided by the Supreme Court in the twentieth century.64 These cases preceded 
the rise of mass digital information aggregation, and, since these cases, there has 
been a surge of data collection and processing.65 In Miller, the respondent was 
suspected of running an illegal whiskey distillery.66 Federal agents subpoenaed 
his bank records and Miller objected, claiming his bank records were his private 
papers.67 The court overruled this objection, holding that because the banking 
information was shared voluntarily with the banks, Miller forfeited his privacy 
attached to his financial records.68 Since the information was voluntarily shared, 
Miller had not been searched under Katz.69 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
distinguished “confidential communications” from “negotiable instruments to 
be used in commercial transactions,” finding that bank records fit into the latter 
category.70 Miller suggests that when documents are voluntarily conveyed to a 
third party, regardless of the purpose of conveyance, the individual relinquishes 
an expectation of privacy in those documents.71 
A few years later, the Supreme Court decided Smith, holding that a warrant is 
not required when a telephone company voluntarily agrees to record a particular 
                                                          
 59 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
 60 Id. at 352. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 353; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464, 466 (1928) overruled by 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 63 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 64 THOMPSON II, supra note 7, at 9. 
 65 Id. at 2, 23–25. 
 66 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976). 
 67 Id. at 436, 438–39. 
 68 Id. at 437, 442–43. 
 69 Id. at 443. 
 70 Id. at 442. 
 71 Id. at 443. 
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user’s telephone number records and to furnish said records to the police.72 The 
court noted that because most people at the time were aware that the phone 
company recorded the phone numbers they dialed by using pen registers, there 
was no legitimate expectation of privacy.73 In addition, because the information 
was voluntarily disclosed, Smith assumed the risk that the telephone company 
might disclose the information to the police.74 The court further reasoned: 
The switching equipment that processed those numbers is merely the 
modern counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, personally 
completed calls for the subscriber. Petitioner concedes that if he had 
placed his calls through an operator, he could claim no legitimate 
expectation of privacy. We are not inclined to hold that a different 
constitutional result is required because the telephone company has 
decided to automate.75 
In Smith, the presence of technology did not alter the application of the third-
party doctrine.76 
The court differentiated Smith from Katz, stating that the pen registers at issue 
in Smith “[did] not acquire the contents of communications,” as in Katz.77 Justice 
Stewart further clarified the line between content and non-content general 
records in his Smith dissent: 
Nevertheless, the Court today says [Fourth Amendment] safeguards 
do not extend to the numbers dialed from a private telephone, 
apparently because when a caller dials a number the digits may be 
recorded by the telephone company for billing purposes. . . . The 
telephone conversation itself must be electronically transmitted by 
telephone company equipment, and may be recorded or overheard by 
the use of other company equipment. Yet we have squarely held that 
the user of even a public telephone is entitled “to assume that the 
words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the 
world.”78 
In dissent, Justice Stewart explained that people retain a reasonable expectation 
                                                          
 72 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979). 
 73 Id. at 743; Pen Register, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining a pen 
register as “an electronic device that tracks and records all the numbers dialed from a 
particular telephone line, as well as all the routing, addressing, or signaling information 
transmitted by other means of electronic communications”). 
 74 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744. 
 75 Id. at 744–45 (citations omitted). 
 76 Id. at 742–45. 
 77 Id. at 741. 
 78 Id. at 746–47 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
352 (1967)). 
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of privacy in their conversations regardless of where they occur.79 
In 2012, the court decided United States v. Jones.80 In Jones, government 
agents installed a Global Positioning System (“GPS”) tracking device on the 
defendant’s vehicle without a valid warrant.81 Ultimately, the placement of the 
device constituted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; the 
majority returned to pre-Katz doctrine, emphasizing the fact that because the 
government had physically attached the GPS device to the vehicle (an effect), 
the government had physically intruded, and therefore, a search had occurred.82 
A year later, the court examined the warrantless search and seizure of cellular 
telephone contents incident to arrest in Riley v. California.83 The Supreme Court 
created yet another exception to the Fourth Amendment when it decided that a 
warrant must be obtained from a judicial officer before law enforcement officers 
can search the contents of a phone.84 Although the third-party doctrine was not 
discussed at length in Riley, the opinion did demonstrate the court’s recognition 
of the difficulties that consumers and courts face when assessing whether an 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in information stored on 
electronic devices.85 The importance of Riley becomes clear when considering 
if the data the government is interested in resides on the device because, if so, 
then it should receive the same Fourth Amendment protections as data stored on 
a computer or a cellphone.86 The court in Riley also considered the immense 
storage capacity that is available on cellphones; modern cellphones gather 
information and store that information in one place, thus the records can provide 
a detailed look into an individual’s life.87 
Thus, Jones is controlling with respect to GPS searches with a physical 
trespass, and Riley is controlling when searching a cellphone’s data. Jones and 
Riley were the Supreme Court’s first steps in addressing technology in the digital 
age. The Carpenter case is a blend of these two cases; the case involves long 
term tracking like in Jones, as well as a device that can pinpoint location with 
near-perfect accuracy, like in Riley. 
In Carpenter, the petitioner was charged with aiding and abetting robbery that 
affected interstate commerce after the FBI obtained orders from a magistrate 
judge for cellphone records88 under the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”).89 
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 80 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012). 
 81 Id. at 403. 
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 84 Id. at 401. 
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This act, enacted by Congress as Title II of the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (“ECPA”), set forth provisions detailing privacy expectations with 
respect to means of electronic transmission, which include telephones and 
computers.90 With Carpenter, the act gave the government access to petitioner’s 
CSLI obtained from a third-party cellphone service provider that would 
otherwise be private information.91 CSLI is produced when a phone user sends 
or receives data, such as phone calls or text messages, which are then transmitted 
to the closest cellular tower through radio waves, thus producing precise 
records.92 These records include the date and time of transmitted data and the 
approximate location of where the call began and ended based on the proximity 
of the nearest cell tower.93 Under the SCA, law enforcement does not need to 
obtain a search warrant in order to access these records; rather, law enforcement 
must only obtain a court order by meeting the reasonable suspicion standard, 
which is below the probable cause standard that must be met in order to secure 
a warrant.94 
In Carpenter, the police obtained a court order permitting a search of 
Carpenter’s cell records, pursuant to the Stored Communications Act.95 To 
receive this order, law enforcement demonstrated their strong belief to the 
government that the records would be relevant to a robbery investigation after 
receiving tips from one suspect who provided the accomplice’s cellphone 
number.96 The government collected “12,898 location points cataloging 
Carpenter’s movements,” which is “an average of 101 data points per day”97 
over 127 days.98 Using these location points, Carpenter was placed at the scene 
of four robberies in question, leading to Carpenter’s conviction and a prison 
sentence of one-hundred years.99 Following the conviction and appeal, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.100 
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A. The New Rule of Carpenter 
Prior third-party doctrine cases, like Miller and Smith, left individuals with no 
legitimate Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy claim in information 
voluntarily shared with third parties.101 At first blush, because CSLI is held by 
carriers (i.e. third parties) and not customers, Carpenter appeared to fall under 
this doctrine, leaving U.S. citizens vulnerable to retrospective location-tracking 
and warrantless searches on behalf of the government.102 In writing for the 
majority, Chief Justice Roberts took a different approach. 
Roberts wrote, “As technology has enhanced the Government’s capacity to 
encroach upon areas normally guarded against inquisitive eyes, this Court 
sought to ‘assure [] preservation of that degree of privacy against government 
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’ “103 He added that 
because “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
record of his physical movements,” the third-party doctrine does not extend to 
mobile location information.104 
Because CSLI is no more than a byproduct of owning a cellphone, the 
government generally needs a warrant to access those records, especially if the 
government is requesting more than seven days of records from the cellphone 
carrier.105 According to the majority in Carpenter, the police cannot collect 
historical CSLI from a cellphone service provider due to its “depth, breadth, and 
comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its 
collection.”106 If the depth and reach of the surveillance threatens to become “a 
too permeating police surveillance,” it may be justifiable to designate the search 
as an intrusive search under the Fourth Amendment.107 
Due to the “world of difference between the limited types of personal 
information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of 
location information casually collected by wireless carriers today,”108 the 
majority declined to extend the third-party doctrine to the government’s request 
for CSLI.109 Although the court noted that “seismic shifts in digital technology” 
have transformed the traditional third-party doctrine, Chief Justice Roberts 
                                                          
 101 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 
435, 442 (1976). 
 102 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
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limited the language of Carpenter beyond the application of Smith and Miller, 
stating the decision does not “call into question conventional, surveillance 
techniques and tools, such as security cameras. Nor do we address other business 
records that might incidentally reveal location information.”110 
Rather than close this gap in legislation, the court in Carpenter crafted a 
narrow exception to the third-party doctrine for the “unique nature of cell phone 
location records,” requiring the government to obtain a warrant “[b]efore 
compelling a wireless carrier to turn over a subscriber’s CSLI.”111 The court 
made sure to emphasize that this ruling did not impact Miller and Smith.112 
This effort to limit the scope of Carpenter raises questions about the vast 
amount of information that resides outside of the outdated pen registers 
discussed in Smith and the paper bank statements at issue in Miller; nowadays, 
“the Government can access each carrier’s deep repository of historical location 
information” with “just the click of a button.”113 The court also clarified that 
there is no distinction between the contents of cellphones and the CSLI metadata 
they generate.114 The availability of all this information causes concern when 
one considers how common technology is in society and the vast amount of 
information that is shared online. 
Carpenter raises questions about the continued validity of the Katz test in a 
digital world.115 Evolving technologies transform which expectations of privacy 
are considered “reasonable,” as Justices Thomas and Gorsuch have noted.116 At 
the time Miller and Smith were decided, forfeiting privacy rights on a tangible 
item like a pen register or a bank document seemed reasonable.117 However, 
applying the third-party doctrine to online activity, where most of the data is 
stored in one place, poses challenges. As Justice Sotomayor expressed in her 
concurrence in Jones: 
It may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has 
                                                          
 110 Id.; Louise Matsakis, The Supreme Court Just Greatly Strengthened Digital Privacy, 
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no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, 
in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves 
to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. . . . I 
would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some 
member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, 
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.118 
Technology adds a complex layer to evaluating privacy expectations.119 The 
court in Carpenter had an opportunity to clarify exactly how the government can 
and should interact with technology. Yet, the narrow ruling in Carpenter made 
the rules of engagement even more confusing. Carpenter leaves many questions 
open and invites future arguments before the Supreme Court on the topics of 
technology and privacy. For example, unanswered questions include exactly 
how much digital data law enforcement may possess without a warrant and when 
a third party is required to disclose its business records.120 While Carpenter did 
signal that the Fourth Amendment may protect other types of personal 
information held by third parties, such as records regarding location information, 
the case also raises questions about third-party files similar to CSLI.121 As there 
was no constitutional limit discussed in Carpenter regarding CSLI, there is no 
legal limit meant to restrict location surveillance by law enforcement; the 
impacts of Carpenter reach far beyond CSLI, which fails to protect privacy 
interests while advancing the interest of government spying.122 
IV. VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK 
The crucial question for the Supreme Court in deciding in favor of Carpenter 
focused on whether the automatic generation of CSLI is just a byproduct of 
having a cellphone; today, cellphones require no affirmative action.123 In other 
words, as long as the phone is powered on and there is a cellphone tower near 
the phone’s location, its location is being recorded and transmitted to the third-
                                                          
 118 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
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 120 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (holding the seizure of seven days of CSLI data 
constituted a Fourth Amendment search, but the court did not state how many fewer days 
would also constitute a search). 
 121 Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (discussing the fact that advances in technology have led to 
people willingly disclosing to third parties more personal information than in the past). 
 122 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (“[W]e need not decide whether there is a limited 
period for which the Government may obtain an individual’s historical CSLI free from 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny, and if so, how long that period might be. It is sufficient for our 
purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment 
search.”). 
 123 Id. at 2220. 
104 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 28.2 
 JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 
party cellphone carrier.124 
Generally, voluntary conveyance is the premise that threatens the third-party 
doctrine in the technological era. For an action to be considered voluntary, it 
must have been intended, which presumes that the individual knew the relevant 
information would be conveyed.125 Given how omnipresent and necessary 
technology and technological disclosures are, it is nearly impossible to deem 
these actions as voluntary.126 
Prior cases involving privacy have referred to this voluntary participation as 
an “assumption of risk.”127 “When a party reveals private information to another, 
he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the 
authorities, and if that occurs, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit 
governmental use of that information.”128 As a result of voluntary conveyance 
and the assumption of risk under the third-party doctrine, the government is 
permitted to investigate information disclosed to third-party businesses without 
a warrant.129 However, merely allowing a device into one’s life should not be 
enough to void one’s privacy rights, which have been guaranteed to citizens 
since the time of this country’s founding. 
In Carpenter, the court declined to extend the third-party doctrine to CSLI as 
there was no voluntary exposure given that carrying a cellphone has become 
commonplace; in fact, the court even recognized this as “indispensable to 
participation in modern society.”130 The same will likely be true of other smart 
devices, including those found in smart homes. 
An individual may initiate self-surveillance, for example, by purchasing an 
Amazon Echo or using a smartwatch; therefore, it could be argued that while 
using the basic functions of the device, the individual has affirmatively engaged 
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Will Use Smart Home Devices for Spying, GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2016), 
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the device to relay a multitude of information.131 However, the individual does 
not intend to share, nor could he or she ever imagine, the amount of information 
found on these devices, especially when this information is sent to other third 
parties to market products to consumers.132 People connect to technology to 
establish and maintain relationships and function in society.133 They voluntarily 
disclose detailed information about their private lives, such as information about 
religious views or sexual preferences, to social media platforms, including 
Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn, so they can participate in digital social life.134 
Many of these third-party service providers or social media platforms ask users 
to click “I Agree” after a long terms of service agreement or privacy disclosure 
agreement.135 However, the average person does not have the time to read these 
lengthy documents, nor can they understand the complicated legalese that these 
agreements often contain.136 Even if he or she can understand the complicated 
legalese, the individual typically fails to understand the ramifications of sharing 
the information or even the depths of information stored on him or her.137 
V. THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE IMPACT ON TECHNOLOGIES 
Self-cyber surveillance is the “intentional or consensual creation of mass 
information about oneself through electronic tracking or other means.”138 This 
self-cyber surveillance has changed the daily lives of many individuals and has 
altered the privacy of their information.139 Assistive technologies present an 
issue in the accumulation of data retained by third-party businesses.140 This data 
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creation and collection is described loosely as the Internet of Things (“IoT”).141 
IoT is defined as the “aggregation of systems of networks connected to each 
other by the Internet or other radio-type device,” which “creates consensual mass 
self-surveillance.”142 Because this includes any device with the ability to connect 
to the internet, a host of devices are included that seamlessly share information 
to “improve consumer, commercial, health, and other needs.”143 The records 
aggregated from these devices could consist of either metadata or content, or a 
mixture of both.144 Examples of these devices include medicine dispensers that 
remind individuals to take their medicine,145 thermostats that allow individuals 
to adjust their settings from a smartphone,146 or even a trashcan that “scans the 
barcodes of discarded products, automatically adds them to a smartphone’s 
shopping list, and sends a text when the trashcan is full.”147 IoT also includes in-
home technologies, such as the Amazon Echo, and biometric data found on 
Apple Watches and FitBit devices.148 The information shared with these devices 
can also be shared with other devices and applications.149 Many of these devices 
operate by using the same passive data collection that smartphones do; in 
addition, the signals from the devices make them communication devices.150 
Thus, these devices are similar to cellphones and the reasoning behind CSLI 
protection in Carpenter should be extended to them.151 
The aggregation of smart technology data also allows the government to work 
with corporations to create detailed reports on unsuspecting individuals who 
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may have committed crimes.152 Since Carpenter’s narrow decision regarding 
CSLI, the third-party doctrine remains relatively undisturbed.153 However, more 
information will continue to be shared with third-party service providers, 
especially with the advent of new technology. This allows for the disjunction 
between constitutional protections and technology surveillance and allows the 
gap between the two to become progressively more pronounced. In fact, the fear 
of government surveillance is not speculative; the government has requested 
data in the past, notably, to solve crimes, but it is not difficult to imagine this 
data being used in nefarious ways. 
A. Smart Home Devices 
Smart home devices “connect the devices and appliances in your home so that 
they can communicate with each other and with you.”154 These devices are a 
natural progression of IoT. Accordingly, a smart home is defined by appliances 
or devices that are capable of connecting with one another through phone 
applications and the internet.155 
The Amazon Echo is a smart home device that can respond to voice queries 
about the weather, turn down the lights or the temperature, and even order the 
groceries.156 Alexa, Amazon’s voice-activated digital assistant, powers Echo 
devices.157 For the Echo to respond to the owner’s request, it listens for the 
device activation word, “Alexa.”158 Meanwhile, the Echo “records your voice 
and transfers it to a processor for analysis”; the recordings are then streamed and 
stored remotely in the cloud where they can be reviewed at a later date.159 The 
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preferences expressed by an individual to his or her smart home device are used 
to create a comprehensive profile based on that specific consumer’s activities, 
including his daily activities (through the calendar applications), or his health 
profile (through health monitoring applications);160 this profile is then shared by 
third parties. 
A specific example occurred in a widely publicized 2015 case, in which it was 
alleged that an Amazon Echo recorded audio of a man, James Bates, murdering 
his wife in his home.161 Although Mr. Bates consented to the release of records 
held by Amazon, this story represents a cautionary tale regarding the information 
the Amazon Echo retains and is later available, information that the government 
can seize under the third-party doctrine.162 These records contain some of our 
innermost thoughts, including details about our familial, professional, religious, 
and political ties. 
On the one hand, because Echo users voluntarily convey this information to 
third parties, there are no Fourth Amendment protections implicated.163 In 
contrast, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has rendered the home supreme.164 
Justice Scalia indicated that at the core of the Fourth Amendment was the 
individual’s “right to retreat into his own home” and to “be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion.”165 Furthermore, Riley concerns are 
implicated due to the capabilities of these smart home devices.166 The home has 
been considered a sacred place since the time of the Framers and throughout 
Fourth Amendment history.167 However, IoT has grown, mostly unregulated, 
and it is threatening the sanctity of the home.168 Without a Fourth Amendment 
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exception, if the police were to physically enter your home and seize your IoT 
device, later downloading the data, you would have a trespass to your property 
and effects, and therefore a violation of your privacy.169 This concept becomes 
hazy when discussing an interception of your data on the device. This is because, 
as the Echo is always listening, the device serves as a covert listening device, 
informally, “a bug” or wiretap.170 Although a user can delete the records that 
Alexa creates (although it is unclear how many records are deleted from the 
cache of information), it is strongly discouraged because the loss of records 
impairs the performance of the device.171 Compelling individuals to sacrifice 
their privacy rights to their information stored by third parties for the sake of 
convenience is neither reasonable nor acceptable. 
When an individual acquires a new device, he or she is most likely not rushing 
home to read the privacy policy.172 Rather, he or she rushes home to install the 
new piece of technology and to start using it. This hastiness almost always 
results in the user relinquishing personal data in exchange for the use of the new 
device. For example, in 2015, Samsung was in the news for a privacy policy 
related to the use of its Smart TVs.173 The company had initially cautioned 
customers that, through the use of voice recognition, data would be transmitted 
to third parties.174 It did not take long for consumers and news outlets to begin 
reporting on the issue, comparing the Samsung Smart TVs to the telescreens 
featured in George Orwell’s 1984.175 Following the backlash, Samsung changed 
the Smart TV privacy policy to state explicitly how the Voice Recognition 
technology worked. The new policy states: 
If you enable Voice Recognition, you can interact with your Smart 
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TV using your voice. To provide the Voice Recognition feature, your 
voice commands will be transmitted (along with information about 
your device, including device identifiers) to us and we will convert 
your voice commands into text to provide the Voice Recognition 
features. In addition, Samsung may collect voice commands and 
associated texts so that we can evaluate and improve the features. 
Samsung will collect your voice commands when you make a 
specific request to the Smart TV by clicking the activation button 
either on the remote control or on your screen or by speaking a wake 
word … and speaking into the microphone on the remote control or 
Smart TV.176 
Samsung also clarified that individuals could opt-out of voice recognition if they 
had privacy concerns, but the capabilities would be impacted.177 
B. Biometric Technology 
FitBit devices, computing watches designed to track physical activity, raise 
additional concerns. Typically, the Fitbit monitors blood pressure, gives a sleep 
assessment, and counts steps, all of which is intended to help consumers gauge 
their personal health better.178 This device also logs location information and 
uploads this information to a computer or mobile device if it is within range of 
a wireless internet source.179 
This biometric data involves private information that, without the device, the 
individual most likely would not have; this information is extraordinarily 
intimate. However, this information can be “accessed, aggregated (even 
anonymized), and sorted by health companies or insurers to predict health trends 
and create more efficiencies in their businesses,” which could pique the interest 
of other third parties and the government.180 Yet, anonymity may not be enough 
to ensure privacy is protected.181 In fact, according to one researcher, “[t]he way 
we move . . . is so unique that four points [of location information] are enough 
to identify 95% of people.”182 
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The technology behind Fitbit devices is advanced enough that Fitbits can 
track physical exertion consistent with violent acts183 or monitor the elevated 
blood pressure of someone under the influence of drugs.184 
This newfound way of continued attachment to the digital world begs one 
major question: Would the information gathered, likely voluntarily, through 
various sources be considered a business record, thereby requiring third-party 
services to turn over the information on their customers? 
C. Internet Tracking 
It is unclear whether Carpenter applies to all forms of location data, 
specifically geotags that are embedded in digital photographs and describe the 
time, date, and GPS coordinates of where a photograph was taken, as well as 
where the individual logged in to a social-media site if the photograph was 
posted.185 Geotags are similar to CSLI because they are often automatically 
collected without affirmative action by the user.186 However, they are slightly 
different because posting a picture on a public social media site is an affirmative 
action in which the user acknowledges that an indiscriminate group of people 
could see the post.187 This is what happened to millionaire John McAfee, founder 
of McAfee Security Software Company.188 McAfee was wanted by law 
enforcement in connection with a crime, and, although he threw out some taunts, 
authorities could not catch him, until a journalist took a photograph with McAfee 
and uploaded it online.189 This photograph had been routinely geotagged, 
leading a computer hacker to MacAfee’s exact location in a Guatemalan 
village.190 While this case was a win for the police, this case should resonate 
with the average person. It was not difficult for the computer hacker to collect 
this information, even after MacAfee believed he had taken steps to conceal his 
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location.191 Hackers with nefarious intentions could have uncovered this 
geotagged location, and, in the case MacAfee, who had not been accused of 
anything, the police could have then reviewed it for evidence.192 
The government also has access to many of our routine activities. As Eleventh 
Circuit Judge Beverly Martin expressed: 
Nearly every website collects information about what we do when 
we visit. . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment allows the government to 
know from YouTube.com what we watch, or Facebook.com what we 
post or whom we “friend,” or Amazon.com what we buy, or 
Wikipedia.com what we research, or Match.com whom we date—all 
without a warrant. In fact, the government could ask “cloud”-based 
file-sharing services like Dropbox or Apple’s iCloud for all the files 
we relinquish to their servers. I am convinced that most internet users 
would be shocked by this.193 
Individuals leave a digital footprint anytime they interact with devices that 
connect to the internet.194 Paul Ohm, a professor at Georgetown Law Center and 
a privacy advocate, testified to Congress with respect to the trove of data 
collected by sources: 
The list of websites an individual visits, available to a [broadband 
internet access service] provider even when https encryption is used, 
reveals so much more than a member of a prior generation would 
have revealed in a composite list of every book she had checked out, 
every newspaper and magazine she had subscribed to, every theater 
she had visited, every television channel she had clicked to, and 
every bulletin, leaflet, and handout she had read. No power in the 
technological history of our nation has been able until now to watch 
us read individual articles, calculate how long we linger on a given 
page, and reconstruct the entire intellectual history of what we read 
and watch on a minute-by-minute, individual-by-individual basis.195 
Web browsing records give the government access to an unprecedented 
amount of information, and a staggering amount is left unprotected.196 For 
instance, individuals share information about themselves simply by surfing the 
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web because of the tracking methods websites use to store information.197 One 
way websites track people is through cookies, which are small pieces of code 
sent back to the company that detail “whether you are a returning user, the sites 
you visited before, and after visiting their web site, the items you view on a web 
site, and sometimes even the information you enter into the computer while on 
the web site.”198 
D. Storage in the Cloud 
Today, much of one’s private data is held in the “cloud,” which is defined as 
a “combination of structured, semistructured, and unstructured data collected by 
organizations that can be mined for information and used in … advanced 
analytics applications.”199 Essentially, the user “rents space” on a trusted 
server.200 One may do this either because one’s computer cannot store enough 
on its hard drive, for additional protection should a file be wiped off his or her 
computer, or both.201 Many users find cloud storage extremely convenient, 
largely because the cloud can be accessed remotely.202 Nevertheless, cloud 
storage is problematic because it requires users to give their data to a third-party 
service provider who then stores this vast quantity of information.203 
Apple’s iCloud Privacy Policy relating to cloud storage and law enforcement 
provides: 
You acknowledge and agree that Apple may, without liability to you, 
access, use, preserve and/or disclose your Account information and 
Content to law enforcement authorities, government officials, and/or 
a third party, as Apple believes is reasonably necessary or 
appropriate, if legally required to do so or if Apple has a good faith 
belief that such access, use, disclosure, or preservation is reasonably 
necessary to: (a) comply with legal process or request; (b) enforce 
this Agreement, including investigation of any potential violation 
thereof; (c) detect, prevent or otherwise address security, fraud or 
technical issues; or (d) protect the rights, property or safety of Apple, 
its users, a third party, or the public as required or permitted by 
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law.204 
This privacy policy affords very little protection to consumers’ data once the 
data is transferred to the Apple iCloud. 
VI. THE FUTURE OF THE CLOUD 
The SCA, which is part of the ECPA, was an act created to regulate electronic 
communications.205 However, it addresses the technology of the 1960s, thereby 
rendering it nearly ineffective to support privacy intrusions by the government 
on third-party servers that store and process the data that emanates from our 
modern devices.206 
At the time of the SCA’s enactment, “digital information still resided in large 
data centers” and “the data stored in data centers were not readily 
transportable.”207 Because people, and companies, store data everywhere, the 
question becomes: how should the SCA be interpreted in the digital age? 
According to the SCA, a warrant is not required if the data has been stored for 
more than 180 days.208 This stipulation made sense during this time, as online 
storage of data in the cloud was extremely costly, and the IoT had not begun to 
aggregate data as it does now.209 Privacy expectations should not diminish 
simply because 180 days have elapsed, just as privacy expectations do not 
diminish solely because time has passed. 
This outdated language leads to another problem. The SCA defines electronic 
storage “both as ‘any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic 
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof’ and ‘any 
storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for 
purposes of backup protection of such communication.’ “210 Privacy protections 
hinge on these crucial distinctions, but this second definition will cause problems 
with the popularity of the cloud, as the language of the statute excludes much of 
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the data currently stored in the cloud.211 It also does not account for how quickly 
and easily information can be accessed by a third party, which traditionally 
might have been stored on a computer’s hard drive or in a file cabinet.212 The 
immense amount of information stored in a cloud should be afforded greater 
protection than is currently provided. For example, much of the information 
stored through the third-party service Dropbox, a well-known cloud service 
provider, should be covered under the SCA.213 
Essentially, the files in these servers are “papers” in modern electronic 
communications, making cloud storage entitled to an extension of Fourth 
Amendment protection if one acknowledges the modern-day technological 
equivalence of physical storage. In fact, “the cloud is merely an illusion,” as 
information is stored on a physical server rather than a far-off intangible place, 
as the name would suggest.214 The significant difference is that physical 
limitations found in traditional Fourth Amendment cases involving a physical 
intrusion are no longer commonplace in the digital age.215 Still, in relation to the 
third-party doctrine, it remains unclear if cloud data can be considered business 
records.216 
VII. DISCUSSION OF CURRENT PRIVACY THEORIES 
It is imperative that the Supreme Court establish a new precedent governing 
government access to third-party records. These theories will only be described 
insofar as they relate to technology. 
A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test 
Four decades have passed since Justice Harlan opined his reasonable 
expectation of privacy test in his Katz concurrence, and the meaning of the 
phrase is still unclear.217 However, this test is still the cornerstone of many 
privacy rights cases.218 
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The reasonable expectation of privacy test is subjective and outdated. This 
test assumes that judges can effectively assess what a “reasonable” person would 
expect; however, there are two issues that arise from this test.219 First, by 
assuming a judge can discern what a reasonable person might feel about a 
specific type of technology, this also assumes that the judge is up to date on all 
of the technologies people use on a daily basis.220 In addition, it does not leave 
room for reasonable individuals to have differing opinions on what they see as, 
in this case, a reasonable intrusion of privacy.221 Put simply, in a society that 
normalizes comprehensive surveillance, how “reasonable” is the average 
people, and who is the society? Does the average person’s opinion come from 
the majority of people through a poll or survey? If so, this binds the minority 
thinkers to the preferences of the majority, thus ignoring the goal of the Bill of 
Rights of limiting the will of the majority.222 The second issue is related to the 
outdated context of the test. It requires judges to consider new technology and 
then create policy based on how they perceive Americans might understand the 
latest technology and how the technology in question works.223 
As it is currently understood, the expectation of privacy test is often the 
dominant theory cited when questioning Fourth Amendment protections.224 
B. Property/Trespass Theory 
Physical intrusions, regardless of how major or minor the interference, can 
generate a Fourth Amendment violation under the trespass theory.225 “The 
property-based approach emphasizes the historical reverence of property rights 
in the colonial era leading up to the American Revolution.”226 This approach 
was frequently used up until the 1960s when the Katz balancing test replaced it; 
the approach required individuals to prove that the government had physically 
trespassed onto their property before Fourth Amendment relief could be 
considered.227 
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In 2012, Jones dusted off the old trespass doctrine when the court decided that 
a GPS attachment to a car used to monitor the vehicle’s movements was a 
physical trespass.228 In writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stressed the 
physical aspect of the search, reasoning that the government had intruded on the 
Defendant’s privacy when it “inserted [an] information-gathering device.”229 
However, the majority did not disturb the long-held privacy formulation defined 
in Katz, signaling an era in which Fourth Amendment protections were 
subjective and based on the type of trespass that occurred.230 Justice Scalia most 
likely chose the property approach over the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test established in Katz because it was more straight-forward.231 
C. Mosaic Theory 
Privacy activist Orin Kerr explains the “Mosaic Theory” as an “aggregated 
set of data acquisitions,” noting that a set of non-searches can amount to a search 
because the collection of the data and following analysis creates a revealing 
mosaic of a person’s private life.232 It is the aggregation of these movements, 
regardless of whether the movements occurred in public, that is worthy of 
protection.233 A mosaic search might bring together locations and timeframes 
that illustrate a comprehensive picture of a suspect’s life.234 The problem with 
the Mosaic Theory, like with the current reasonable expectation of privacy 
theory, is the subjective nature of a violation. The quality of the mosaic will be 
different for each person, especially when considering the different kinds of 
surveillance tools that are available, which raise their own reasonableness 
concerns.235 Courts will then be forced to construct a framework for deciding 
how much, or what kind of information can be gathered before a “search” has 
occurred.236 
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D. Positive Law Theory 
If a court decides to apply the positive law model, it considers whether there 
is a law (or statute, rule, or code), other than the Fourth Amendment, that 
restricts the government’s invasion.237 Positive law questions whether a search 
or seizure occurs by determining whether a private party could lawfully conduct 
the action the government engaged in.238 Accordingly, instead of the court being 
concerned about a “reasonable search,” it would ask, whether in completing the 
search, if the government official violated “general applicable law or avail[ed] 
themselves of a governmental exemption from it.”239 
Positive law may be problematic when new technologies arise because the 
cornerstone of this theory is reliance on existing law. The rate at which 
technology changes and adapts makes it nearly impossible for legislators to keep 
up with regulating emerging technologies, and even if they try, a backlog may 
result due to ever-changing technology.240 It is also possible that some kinds of 
technology are so obscure that any sort of law regulating their use would be ill-
advised.241 Another roadblock preventing this theory from becoming a guiding 
precedent is the existence of technology that only the government has access 
to.242 It may be possible for lawmakers to tweak the laws to allow private parties 
access to the technology to avoid Fourth Amendment scrutiny, fully knowing 
the private parties will never be able to access the devices.243 
E. Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory 
Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory is defined by privacy scholar Orin Kerr as 
the idea that the courts adjust “legal rules to restore the preexisting balance of 
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police power.”244 Under this theory, if a case arose, the judge would adjust the 
level of protection for new technology to maintain this balance of power.245 Kerr 
argues that the courts should decide this protection to restore a time which he 
calls “Year Zero.”246 Year Zero is a fictional time that is used as a basis to see 
how the “introduction of new tools poses a constant challenge to any legal 
system that seeks to regulate police investigations.”247 
This theory considers the dynamic nature of technology and social change,248 
and realizes that new tools and attitudes threaten the security and privacy balance 
between criminals and police because they allow both sides to “accomplish tasks 
they couldn’t before” or undertake those tasks “more easily or cheaply than 
before.”249 The police should not possess so much power that they are able to 
infringe upon an individual’s civil liberties, but they must also be powerful 
enough to enforce the law.250 This theory is more of a method of maintaining the 
status quo of power rather than an effort to restore the Fourth Amendment to the 
Founder’s original intent. 
This theory only exacerbates the Fourth Amendment privacy judicial delay 
problem that the courts already face. Kerr argues this delay would be encouraged 
to ensure the courts do not make decisions about technology too quickly.251 
However, this delay would only complicate decisions due to the difficult to 
predict and progressive nature of IoT. This theory also requires judges to project 
their respective opinions on various technology-focused cases. 
VIII. THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE AFTER CARPENTER 
Carpenter could have been used to fundamentally change the third-party 
doctrine, but its narrow ruling raises questions and concerns about what kinds of 
digital data and how much data the government may access without a warrant; 
these concerns will likely continue to arise in future privacy cases.252 However, 
Carpenter does provide a roadmap for future decisions as it disfavored the 
government’s ability to claim “a significant extension of [the third-party 
doctrine] to a distinct category of information.”253 The court acknowledged that 
in order to live in modern society, the use of smart technologies is 
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“indispensable.”254 
Online vendors analyze buying preferences to suggest future, related 
purchases.255 There is an electronic trail of when emails are sent and to whom 
they are sent.256 Search engines collect inquiries and store them in case a user 
needs to revisit an old search.257 The news applications on phones filter stories 
and suggest new ones based on past interests.258 Home security cameras can be 
monitored from cellphones; doors and windows to houses can be locked from a 
smartphone.259 
Professor Daniel Solove, an expert in the privacy field, considered the third-
party doctrine to be “one of the most serious threats to privacy in the digital 
age.”260 The abandonment of the third-party doctrine should be favored and 
replaced with an approach that is neutral, regardless of the type of technology, 
to eliminate uncertainty and confusion over whether society has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the presence of certain technologies. In theory, a new 
approach should also allow the market to create new technologies and help 
consumers fully understand the privacy implications of the devices they 
purchase to permit informed decisions about using them. A new theory should 
also preclude the need to prosecute the privacy concerns over every new 
application, device, or company that maintains records about us. 
As Justice Gorsuch explained in his dissent in Carpenter, the third-party 
doctrine is woefully incapable of reconciling Fourth Amendment protections in 
the modern age, stating, “Even our most private documents—those that, in other 
eras, we would have locked safely in a desk drawer or destroyed—now reside 
on third-party servers.”261 
The third-party doctrine should not apply with respect to certain technologies 
because much of the information forfeited by individuals is completed on behalf 
of their devices.262 To waive Fourth Amendment protections, the individual must 
                                                          
 254 Id. at 2220 (citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)). 
 255 Lisa Magloff, Examples of Targeted Advertising, CHRON, 
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/examples-targeted-advertising-10869.html (last visited Apr. 
27, 2020). 
 256 Understanding Email Message Flow, from Sending to Delivery, SPARKPOST, 
https://www.sparkpost.com/resources/email-explained/email-message-flow-sending-
delivery/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2020). 
 257 Magloff, supra note 255. 
 258 The Apple News App, APPLE SUPPORT, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202329 
(last visited Apr. 29, 2020). 
 259 Can I Control My Home Security from My Phone?, SAFEWISE (Feb. 6, 2020), 
https://www.safewise.com/home-security-faq/home-security-phone/. 
 260 Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided 
Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 753 (2005). 
 261 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 262 See Solove, supra note 260, at 753 (explaining the lack of voluntariness of people and 
2020] Protecting Online Privacy in the Digital Age 121 
voluntarily provide information to a third party.263 However, many device users 
do not voluntarily relinquish information; rather, when the devices are powered 
on, information is sent on behalf of the individual to third parties.264 No 
voluntary action triggers this collection, and warrantless government searches 
conducted under the authority of the third-party doctrine should be 
unconstitutional. Because this is similar to the reasoning in Carpenter, this data 
collection should be given the same protections as CSLI.265 
It is estimated that by 2027, forty-one billion IoT devices will be in use, up 
from eight billion in 2019.266 This rapid expansion highlights the importance of 
establishing protections for data held by third parties, rather than just protecting 
CSLI. 
IX. REVISITING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
An awareness of the text and history of the Fourth Amendment and an 
understanding of modern technology is required for deciding privacy cases in 
the digital age. The understanding of what areas are constitutionally protected 
has grown to reflect changes in society and technology, with even originalist, 
conservative judges willing to expand protections to cover modern 
technologies.267 In his dissenting opinion in Carpenter, Judge Gorsuch 
explained the importance of preserving the privacy that was intended since the 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, stating that the Fourth Amendment must 
protect “specific rights known at the founding” and also their “modern 
analogues.”268 
The modern definitions of “papers” and “effects” are very complex compared 
to what the Framers had at the time of the Fourth Amendment. However, through 
the jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment, one can see that they essentially 
serve the same purpose; emails are modern letters,269 and computers are like file 
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cabinets.270 The computers and software that store our digital footprints hold 
enormous amounts of data that could equal the massive amounts of data of the 
“papers” and “effects” the Founders envisioned.271 Professor Davies, a well-
known privacy scholar, has stated: 
In sum, although the evidence on this point is less than definitive, the 
available linguistic and statutory evidence suggests that “persons, 
houses, papers, and effects” was understood to provide clear 
protection for houses, personal papers, the sorts of domestic and 
personal items associated with houses, and even commercial 
products or goods that might be stored in houses—while leaving 
commercial premises and interests otherwise subject to 
congressional discretion.272 
The text of the Fourth Amendment expresses the “right to be secure” in one’s 
person, house, papers, and effects; the Framers intended to preserve that liberty 
against undue infringement, specifically state intrusion, by government officers 
regardless of the inevitable shifting of cultural norms.273 Old-fashioned deposit 
receipts have been replaced by a digital paper.274 When cars pass through a toll 
booth, an electronic record is created that logs the location and time of the 
passing.275 The modern equivalent of papers the Framers stored in their desks is 
digital computer files.276 Due to the history and purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment, “papers” should be read as an expressive analog to the more 
conventional, physical papers. This reading allows people to retain their 
guaranteed constitutional rights while also recognizing the role of technology 
and how it has altered the world. It is also necessary for this framework to work 
along a continuum. Information that is freely shared with others, for example, 
revealing comments left on public social media pages, deserves little to no 
protection.277 Data that the user takes a concerted effort to restrict access to, data 
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that contains deeply revealing information, or data that would typically be 
covered under the Fourth Amendment should be protected. This is due to the 
large amount of information that is held by third parties that, if shared, would 
threaten to expose some of people’s innermost thoughts and questions, even 
bordering on characteristics that one would only share with his or her private 
diary or journal. 
Under the existing doctrine, a gap exists in how to classify an “effect.” The 
term “effects” has long been understood to extend to personal property;278 in 
fact, the court has referenced objects such as automobiles279 and luggage280 as 
“effects” throughout its history. Due to the digital age, many scholars have 
suggested a broader reading of “effects” to cover computers, telephones, and 
other storage devices.281 There is no reason why “effects” cannot be updated to 
be consistent with Fourth Amendment principles, as it would include the smart 
data, as well as signals emanating from the device. 
The IoT offers new surveillance possibilities that do not require physical 
intrusion, resulting in the possibility of increased government surveillance that 
can reveal daily routines.282 
The Fourth Amendment was not intended to define privacy; rather, like the 
rest of the Constitution, it is meant to recognize the necessity of limiting the 
government’s power and discretion.283 Despite new breakouts of technology, it 
is crucial that the Fourth Amendment is reevaluated to provide for traditional 
privacy limits because with current interpretations, the Fourth Amendment is 
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ineffective against certain government intrusions. 
A. Technology or Privacy: Do You Have to Choose Just One? 
Often, many people explain away their privacy by stating they have “nothing 
to hide,” and because they are not doing anything wrong, they need not worry 
about the government having access to their information.284 These explanations 
are known, respectively, as Nothing to Hide and All-or-Nothing. 
1. Nothing to Hide 
When discussing data privacy and technology, many people respond by 
saying they have nothing to hide. Variations of this argument include: 
1. If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear.285 
2. “Like I said, I have nothing to hide. The majority of the American people have 
nothing to hide. And those that have something to hide should be found out, and 
get what they have coming to them.”286 
3. “Do I care if the FBI monitors my phone calls? I have nothing to hide. Neither 
does 99.99 percent of the population. If the wiretapping stops one of these Sept. 
11 incidents, thousands of lives are saved.”287 
The issue with this line of reasoning is that it assumes everything should be 
public knowledge because nothing can be used against you. One journalist in 
Time asserted: “The more I learned about data-mining, the less concerned I was. 
Sure, I was surprised that all these companies are actually keeping permanent 
files on me. But I don’t think they will do anything with them that does me any 
harm”; he further stated he was not worried because no human being ever reads 
the files.288 This line of thinking is dangerous for two reasons: first, it fails to 
consider that some information may be perceived by government officials to be 
a pattern of criminal behavior, thereby giving the government a valid reason to 
monitor for criminal activity; second, these individuals sacrifice the rights of 
others because they do not care what happens to them.289 Furthermore, 
individuals could read the files if they chose to, and, if a person was ever 
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implicated in a crime, the government could seize the files and easily read about 
the person’s whereabouts going back decades.290 
Overall, this mindset leads to negative results, as it assists in the slow erosion 
of privacy rights over time.291 For example, say the government begins to record 
telephone conversations arbitrarily. The individuals who support the nothing to 
hide theory may shrug their shoulders and brush the records off as minimal or 
non-invasive because the telephone conversation recordings are not widespread 
and, according to them, may cause at least one crime to be solved. To them, the 
benefits outweigh the risks. Alternatively, say the government begins 
monitoring some people’s credit card statements in hopes of finding suspicious 
purchases. The individuals have not been flagged for suspicious purchases; 
rather the decision on who to monitor is pure chance. They may claim the 
government does not want to cause harm, which may be true, but the release of 
records may cause inadvertent harm. The more people who have access to the 
records, the more of a chance they will be leaked or the wrong person will gain 
access to them.292 At first blush, these two examples may sound gradual but after 
a while, the government will have collected information on every American. 
What if the government takes this information and infers criminal activity? 
2. All or Nothing 
Privacy and national security need not be mutually exclusive; surrendering 
privacy does not necessarily make citizens more secure, but surrendering 
security does not necessarily equate to an erosion of Fourth Amendment 
rights.293 It is possible to allow for government oversight with “a degree of 
limitation” because the Fourth Amendment works through judicial oversight.294 
This framework does not account for the nuances of technology. What if one 
wants to use Amazon Alexa to help organize his or her day, but this individual 
does not want it to provide his or her daily activities to the government freely? 
Currently, there are no provisions in place that would allow a person to 
accomplish this, other than not purchasing an Alexa (or other technology), due 
to the implementation and analysis of the third-party doctrine.295 
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This all or nothing mindset encompasses the third-party doctrine as it relates 
to technology not considered in Carpenter. Concerning CSLI and privacy cases 
that came before it, the All or Nothing Framework is better classified as Mostly 
All or Nothing. 
X. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
The Supreme Court is likely to address privacy jurisprudence, and new 
technologies, using the same piecemeal, incremental approach that has plagued 
old-fashioned common law.296 The court has been reluctant to decide more than 
what stands before it, probably because judges do not feel they are able to fully 
understand contemporary technology or society’s increasing desire to 
incorporate technology into daily routines.297 Because this is the same judicial 
process that has brought us through Carpenter, it is imperative that society 
encourage private businesses or the legislature to step in and acknowledge 
privacy rights. To incentivize companies to safeguard consumers’ privacy, it 
must first be “valued by consumers as a commodity in its own right, much like 
organic foods have become a valued food type.”298 
Companies should be responsible for safely collecting and transferring data, 
whether through the use of encryption on behalf of the company or partnerships 
with the government to encourage transparency.299 The technology giants, such 
as Apple and Microsoft, should also stand up against governmental intrusion on 
behalf of their customers.300 Consumers rely on them to protect their interests 
because the government can and will request consumers’ data from them.301 
A. Encryption 
Encryption is “the process of encoding information such that a key is required 
to decode it.”302 Encryption helps keep information secret from anyone who is 
not intended to have access to it through the use of a decryption key.303 
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Encryption prevents the government, or anyone else, from gaining access to 
personal files and communications.304 Currently, encryption provides a safe 
environment for internet and institutional commerce; so, it is not far off to 
assume that wider deployment of encryption to the public might be possible in 
the future.305 This type of personal encryption would negatively impact law 
enforcement because encryption “makes it impossible, irrespective of warrants, 
for law enforcement to recover” the previously encrypted information.306 
One privacy scholar contends that encryption to protect against a cyber-
intrusion is analogous to physical locks, bolts, and alarms in a physical 
intrusion.307 When encryption is afforded by companies, rather than individual 
consumers, the companies may provide discretionary access to the government 
as they have the keys to decrypt.308 For example, WhatsApp offers end-to-end 
encryption for messages, voice calls, and videos.309 Nevertheless, WhatsApp 
communication metadata is generally available to law enforcement, if 
required.310 
In contrast, Apple has shown its unwillingness to support the government, 
despite its privacy policy.311 Most notably, Apple would not create a backdoor 
for the encrypted cellphone of a deceased terrorist, Syed Farook in San 
Bernardino.312 Apple was ordered by a federal magistrate judge to provide a 
backdoor to the government to allow federal investigators to determine if the 
terrorist was working alone.313 Apple denied this request, asserting its 
commitment to ensuring the privacy of its millions of customers.314 In the end, 
the government hacked the terrorist’s phone without Apple’s assistance.315 
However, this is not to say that Apple never hands over data to the government; 
in fact, Apple can and does disclose iCloud data to law enforcement.316 The 
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difference, theoretically, between these two cases is that in the terrorist attack, 
by providing the backdoor to the terrorist’s phone, the government could 
conceivably hack all iPhone users with the touch of a button, whereas with the 
iCloud, the government must contact Apple in order to retrieve the 
information.317 It may also be possible that the market will encourage individuals 
to better protect their privacy. As two technology advocates, Gershenfeld and 
Vasseur, concluded: 
By extending cryptography down to the level of individual devices, 
the owners of those devices would gain a new kind of control over 
their personal information. Rather than maintaining secrecy as an 
absolute good, it could be priced based on the value of sharing. Users 
could set up a firewall to keep private the Internet traffic coming from 
the things in their homes—or they could share that data with, for 
example, a utility that gave a discount for their operating their 
dishwasher only during off-peak hours or a health insurance provider 
that offered lower rates in return for their making healthier lifestyle 
choices.318 
This suggestion allows consumers to choose whether they want to participate in 
the IoT, giving them the privacy many individuals desire while also allowing 
them to stay connected. 
B. Right to be Forgotten 
Many legal scholars have suggested a “right to be forgotten” law, which draws 
its support and history from European countries.319 This law is intended to secure 
private information for private individuals, as it allows individuals to have 
certain information deleted from search engines or places where internet records 
are stored.320 It strives to balance data protection and the right of privacy with 
the public’s interest in access to the information.321 Critics contend that if a 
similar “right to be forgotten” law is adopted by Americans, there would be 
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profound impacts on the First Amendment Constitutional rights of freedom of 
speech and freedom of the press.322 They claim it would be antithetical to one of 
the nation’s founding principles: the free flow of information; they claim it 
amounts to censorship.323 Secondly, critics argue that to allow private companies 
to remove certain information puts corporations in charge of enforcing privacy 
rights, thereby becoming the ones in charge of enforcing the balance between 
free speech and privacy.324 On the other hand, supporters of a right to be 
forgotten law in the United States say it will allow individuals to better control 
their personal data.325 They argue that much of the information online can be 
used to damage individuals and their respective futures.326 
Currently, there are laws that cover many aspects of personal privacy in 
transactions, but they are not as encompassing as the right to be forgotten. Two 
examples include the Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”) and the ECPA.327 Both of these acts regulate the use of personal 
information.328 
C. Congressional Interception 
An essential feature of society is the relationship between humans and the 
government; specifically, the checks and balances system enacted through the 
founding documents and the nature of the Republic. Individuals should be more 
vigilant about what information they disclose.329 However, new developments 
in technology continue to maximize third-party disclosures.330 Congress has the 
opportunity to craft legislation, with the Constitution in mind, that is amicable 
to law enforcement and the public, unlike the judiciary which can only rule on 
cases and laws that come before it.331 
Consumers could benefit from federal privacy legislation as this would at 
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least present a baseline that all companies would follow.332 As long as this 
baseline has consequences for those who do not comply, it would allow for 
nearly all companies to play by the same rules because the internet and other 
online devices cross state lines.333 The legislation should be broad enough to 
account for rapidly changing technology, but narrow enough to ensure data 
security and privacy.334 Furthermore, if companies wanted to take additional 
precautions to protect privacy, they should be welcome to do so under this new 
law.335 
XI. CONCLUSION 
The digital transition from physical papers and the well-known concept of 
“effects” represents a dangerous time for citizens’ civil liberties. The 
enumeration of the Fourth Amendment protections reflects the Founders’ 
commitment to the development of thoughts, ideas, and beliefs. It is necessary 
that the Fourth Amendment is read to apply to all digital information, as a 
functional equivalent to the physical papers and effects that existed during the 
time of the Founding Fathers, if the United States is to preserve the right to 
privacy for future generations. The Founding Fathers could not have ever 
imagined the progression of technology, but their ideas and the foundation for 
the Fourth Amendment protecting certain things remains the same. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding privacy has been plentiful, but the 
court’s decisions have focused on the devices rather than focusing on the types 
of information collected by devices in general. The cornerstone for many of 
these decisions has been the Fourth Amendment concept of reasonableness, but 
what is reasonable with respect to electronic data is neither clear nor consistent. 
As smart devices and internet tracking become even more prevalent, there is an 
urgent need to retire the third-party doctrine and reconsider the outdated nature 
of the SCA. Carpenter was a step in the right direction for CSLI, but it did not 
consider the vast array of technologies and the methods of data collection yet to 
emerge. 
Americans must ensure the rights that were guaranteed by the Constitution at 
the time of founding are still applicable for digitization, regardless of the new 
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technologies that develop in the IoT. The Constitution may have been written a 
long time before cellphones and the internet were devised, but its beliefs of 
personal autonomy and privacy are unwavering. 
Today, most of the information is stored on third-party servers; if this 
information can be obtained without a warrant, Fourth Amendment privacy 
protections are meaningless. If the third-party doctrine, as it stands, were to be 
applied to the IoT, the government would be given unlimited access to an 
individual’s personal information as part of a comprehensive IoT profile. 
In Carpenter, the court declined to extend the third-party doctrine to the data 
collected by cellphones, but this narrow interpretation only creates more 
questions than it answers. The smart home will soon be as much of a necessity 
to modern life as cellphones. The eroding roots of voluntary conveyance and 
assumption of risk of the third-party doctrine require a re-examination of the 
doctrine. 
Consumers should be encouraged to care about their privacy and advocate to 
private businesses the importance of privacy. If lawmakers want to be involved, 
they should develop a comprehensive, timeless protocol to guide law 
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